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Introduction
Motivation. Participation of traders in security markets is often limited or restricted, since several factors may prevent individual or institutional investors from accessing certain assets. This is the case, for example, for mutual and pension funds, which by law are not allowed to hold certain instruments (for instance, bonds with low credit rates, over-the-counter derivatives, securities in private placements, etc.), or hedge funds that choose not to trade in some securities in order to emphasise the speciality of their investment strategies. Furthermore, investors may avoid certain securities due to high transaction costs and margin requirements, or due to the difficulty in processing information related to their payoff; see, for example, the related discussion in [CG10] and the references therein.
Prompted by these aforementioned restricted participation considerations, several theoretical studies have developed equilibrium models assuming that traders' portfolio sets are restrictedsee [AC09] , [PS97] , [CG10] and [HHP06] for exogenously imposed restrictions, and [CGV09] and [CGES04] for endogenously arisen restrictions. These models assume a competitive market structure: individual traders do not impact prices as part of the transactions, and are essentially considered as price-takers. However, several empirical studies (see for instance [RW15] and the references therein) have shown that large institutional investors cover a large part of the market's volume; therefore, their orders will influence the prices of traded securities, and eventually allocations in the portfolios of all traders. Especially in markets with restricted participation, where trading involves less participants, assuming that the investors (and in particular the large ones) have no price impact is not consistent with what we observe in practice. In this paper, we assume that investors have possible participation constrains, and recognise the impact they have to equilibrium prices. The assumption that all traders' actions have price impact essentially implies that only large investors participate in the transaction of each security, in an oligopolistic market structure.
The latter is effectively consistent with (at least) the primary level of security trading.
Contribution and connections with existing literature. Our work is related to two strands of literature on security equilibrium pricing. Firstly, we contribute to the ongoing research on thin financial markets, where all traders are assumed strategic; secondly, our results are linked to equilibrium models under restricted (or limited) traders' participation.
More precisely, we adapt the standard CARA-normal model and as in [RW15] , [Viv11] , [MR17] , [Ant17] and study the equilibrium pricing and allocation of a bundle of securities where the assumption of traders being price-takers is withdrawn. We suppose that traders' actions impact prices and, therefore, securities allocation choice, and that traders act strategically, through the demand schedules they submit in the transaction. The paper contributes on this front of the literature by considering a model where (1) traders are heterogeneous, not only concerning their risk tolerance, but also in their beliefs (on expectations and on covariance matrices); and (2) traders have restricted participation, in the sense that they do not necessarily have access to the trade of all securities.
In such a setting, we consider a demand-slope game (as in [RW12] , [RW15] and [MR17] ) and prove the existence and the (global) uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for any traders' participation scheme.
(The only additional imposed assumption is that at least three traders participate in the trading of each security. The latter is necessary for equilibrium to exist; see, amongst others, [Kyl89] and [RW15].) Our main result, Theorem 1.4, also gives an iterative numerical algorithm for fast numerical calculation of the equilibrium quantities. Theorem 1.4 can be seen as a generalisation of Literature discussing models with limited participation (see, amongst others, [RZ09] , [Zig04] and [Zig06] ) distinguishes market participants to arbitrageurs and competitive investors. Arbitrageurs have access to all tradeable assets and act strategically in a Cournot-type of framework, while investors are assumed price-takers. In our paper, all traders act strategically, even if some of them have access to all securities and others do not. Our model is hence more appropriate when large investors know that they can influence the market even if they are restricted to trade only a subset of the securities.
1. Equilibrium Price Impact with Restricted Participation 1.1. Traders, securities and notation. In the market, we consider a finite number of traders and use the index set I to denote them. There are a finite number of tradeable risky securities, and their index set is denoted by K. We model restricted market participation by assuming that trader i ∈ I has access to (effectively, is allowed to trade in) only a subset K i ⊆ K of the securities; in other words, trader i ∈ I may select units of securities in the subspace of X ≡ R K defined via
Before giving more details of the model's structure, we need to establish some necessary definitions and notation. For each i ∈ I, we shall denote by π i the projection operator from X on the space X i ; for x ∈ X , π i x has the effect of keeping all coordinate entries of x corresponding to K i intact, while replacing all coordinate entries of x corresponding to K \ K i with zero.
Define S as the set of all symmetric linear nonnegative-definite forms on X . On S , define the partial order via For k ∈ K, define I k := {i ∈ I | k ∈ K i } to be the set of traders that have access to trading security k. A minimal requirment for any meaningful equilibrium model is that |I k | ≥ 2, for all k ∈ K. When we deal with price impact later on, we shall see that the stronger condition |I k | ≥ 3, for all k ∈ K, is necessary and sufficient for existence (and uniqueness) equilibrium.
(Note that the necessity of the latter assumption on linear Nash demand equilibria is well-known in the literature-see, for instance, [Kyl89] and [Viv11] .)
The next simple linear algebra result will be used throughout the paper, sometimes tacitly.
Proof. Set D −j := i∈I\{j} D i . Let z ∈ X , and assume z, D −j z = 0. Then, z, D i z = 0 for all
≻ , we have z ℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈ K i , whenever i ∈ I \ {j}. Therefore, z ℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈ i∈I\{j} K i . But, i∈I\{j} K i = K, since we assume that |I k | ≥ 2 for all k ∈ K.
1.2. Preferences and demand. Trader i ∈ I has preferences numerically represented via the linear-quadratic functional
where x represents units of securities held from the set K i , u i ∈ R is the baseline utility of trader
Remark 1.2. A special case of preferences numerically represented by the functional in (1.1), is when the latter coincides with the certainty equivalent of expected constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, and payoffs have a joint Gaussian distribution-see, for instance, [Kyl89] , [Vay99] and [MR17] . We elaborate more on this in the next paragraph, in order to enforce the point that, in our modelling framework, hetereogeneity in multiple levels is allowed; more precisely, our model shall allow for:
• heterogeneity in the traders' risk aversions;
• heterogeneous in the traders' subjective beliefs regarding the expectations and covariance structure of the securities; and
• traders' initial endowments which may not be spanned by the securities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in a setting with restricted participation which allows all of the above.
Let S ≡ (S k ; k ∈ K) denote the vector of securities, and E i denote the random initial position of agent i ∈ I. Assume that δ i > 0 is the risk tolerance of trader i ∈ I, and the vector (E i , S) has a joint Gaussian law under the agent's subjective probability P i . Let C i be the covariance matrix under P i of S, where only the components of K i are regarded, and the other entries are equal to zero. Assume that
≻ . Furthermore, let c i ∈ X i be the vector whose entry k ∈ K i is the covariance under P i between E i and S k , and f i ∈ X i denote the vector whose entry k ∈ K i is the expectation under P i of S k . Finally, let the baseline utility of agent i ∈ I equal
Then, a position x ∈ X i leads to certainty equivalent equal to
which is exactly of the form (1.1), with
Note that the above measures utility in monetary terms, B −X i captures jointly the trader's risk tolerance level δ i and the covariance matrix of the securities.
1.3. Price impact. Under a competitive market setting, each trader i ∈ I is assumed to be a price-taker; therefore, for any given vector of security prices p ∈ X , the aim is the maximisation of the utility U i (q) − q, p , over demand vectors q ∈ X i . However, and as emphasised in the introductory section, there are several security markets where such a price-taking assumption is problematic. Especially under a restricted participation environment as the one dealt with here, the possibility that large investors may influence the market is more intense, and the need arises to take into account the strategic behaviour of participating traders in the market.
We consider and analyse the concept of Bayesian Nash market equilibrium in linear bid schedules, Below, we give the line of argument for the individual trader's optimal allocation given a perceived price impact. We follow [Wer11] and [RW15], assuming that traders perceive a linear price impact of the orders they submit; more precisely, a net order of ∆q ∈ X i for trader i ∈ I will move prices by Λ i ∆q, where Λ i ∈ S ≻ is the so-called price impact (similar to Kyle's lambda [Kyl89] ), and will be eventually endogenously determined in equilibrium. Let p ∈ X be a vector of pretransaction security prices. Under the previous linear price impact setting, an allocation q ∈ X i for trader i ∈ I will cost q, p = q, p + Λ i q , where p = p + Λ i q will be the actual transaction security prices. This means that the post-transaction utility of trader i ∈ I will equal
Given Λ i , each trader i ∈ I wants to maximise the above utility by choosing demand vectors q from the subspace X i , as there is no demand for securities that trader has no access to. Therefore, with pre-transaction prices p, the optimisation problem that trader i ∈ I faces is
Since the above maximisation problem is strictly concave on X i , we may use first-order conditions for optimality, which give that
where the fact that π i q i = q i holds (since q i ∈ X i ) was used. Note that the above first order conditions are consistent with [MR17, optimisation relation (5)], adjusted to our restricted participation setting. Since B
and noting that X i π i = X i , we obtain that
To recapitulate: given a perceived linear price impact Λ i ∈ S ≻ , and with X i given by (1.3), the relationship between the optimal allocation q i ∈ X i of trader i ∈ I with actual transaction prices p ∈ X is given by (1.4). In view of (1.4), the matrix X i ∈ S X i ≻ of (1.3) has the interpretation of a negative demand slope for trader i ∈ I.
1.4. Equilibrium with restricted participation and price impact. Given the above best response individual traders' problem, we shall discuss now how price impact is formed in equilibrium.
Assuming that each trader i ∈ I perceives linear price impact Λ i ∈ S ≻ , and given the relationship between the optimal allocation q i ∈ X i of trader i ∈ I with transaction prices p ∈ X given by (1.4) and X i ∈ S X i ≻ given by (1.3), the equilibrium prices p that will clear the market satisfy:
Given that i∈I X i ∈ S ≻ holds by Lemma 1.1, it follows that
Given these equilibrium prices, the equilibrium allocation ( q i ; i ∈ I) will be given by substituting the above expression p for p in (1.4).
Within equilibrium, each trader's perceived market impact should coincide with their actual ones; in this regard, see also Lemma 1 of [RW15] . Assume that all traders, except trader i ∈ I, have price impacts (Λ j ; j ∈ I \ {i}), leading to (X j ; j ∈ I \ {i}) as in (1.3). If trader i ∈ I wishes to move allocation from q i to q i + ∆q ∈ X i , the aggregate position of all other traders has to change by −∆q, which would imply that new prices would equal p + ∆p, where, by (1.4),
we obtain that
It follows that Λ i = X −1 −i has to hold in equilibrium, for all i ∈ I. With the above understanding, and recalling (1.3), we give the following definition of equilibrium. Definition 1.3. A collection (X * i ; i ∈ I) ∈ (S ≻ ) I will be called equilibrium negative demand slopes if
where X * −i := j∈I\{i} X * j , for all i ∈ I. Given equilibrium negative demand slopes (X * i ; i ∈ I) as above, the equilibrium price impacts
1.5. Main result. Recall that we assume that, in order to have a meaningful equilibrium discussion, there are at least two traders for every security: |I k | ≥ 2 holds for all k ∈ K. As Lemma 2.2
shows, if |I k | = 2 holds for some k ∈ K, then there exists no Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1.3. Therefore, the stronger condition |I k | ≥ 3 for all k ∈ K is necessary for Nash equilibrium; the next result shows that this condition is also sufficient for existence of Nash equilibrium, and that it is unique. Theorem 1.4. Whenever |I k | ≥ 3 holds for all k ∈ K, a unique equilibrium (X * i ; i ∈ I) in the sense of Definition 1.3 exists. Moreover, for any initial collection (X 0 i ; i ∈ I) ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ , if one defines inductively the updating sequence
Note that the above result not only guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, but also provides an iterative algorithm to numerically calculate the equilibrium demands and price impacts, where the only inputs are the participation's restrictions and matrices (B i ; i ∈ I).
1.6. A limiting equilibrium. We consider the case where a trader, who has access to the whole security market, approaches risk neutrality. We could interpret this trader as an asymptotically risk-neutral market maker that gives prices to all the securities in the market. Assuming that market maker's preferences are (close to) risk neutral is common in the literature-see, e.g., [Kyl85] , [FJ02] , [BGS05] and the references therein. Here, we similarly consider the (limiting) case of a market maker that acts strategically and the quadratic part of his utility is getting arbitrarily close to zero. We show below that as the preferences of this trader goes to risk-neutrality the corresponding sequence of equilibria converges to a well-defined limit.
Proposition 1.5. Let I = {0, . . . , m}, where m ≥ 2. Assume further that K 0 = K, i.e., trader 0 has access to the whole market. Consider a fixed (B i ) i∈I\{0} , but a nondecreasing sequence (B n 0 ) n∈N with the property that
If (X n ) n∈N stands for the sequence of corresponding to (B n 0 ) n∈N equilibria, then (X n ) n∈N monotonocally converges to a limit X ∞ ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ . Furthermore, (X ∞ i ) i∈I\{0} solves the system
and it holds that X ∞ 0 = X ∞ −0 .
The proof of Proposition 1.5 is given in §2.5.
Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1.4 will be given in a series of subsections, starting with §2.1 and concluding in §2.4. As already mentioned, §2.5 contains the proof of Proposition 1.5.
The fixed point equation. Let
According to Definition 1.3, the equilibrium negative demand slopes are given as the fixed points of F , i.e., solutions to the equation
The following lemma provides upper bounds for the functional F .
Lemma 2.1. For each i ∈ I, it holds that F i (X) ≺ X i B i , as well as
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, we readily have that B
implies the order
For the second order, we first show that
holds for each i ∈ I. Indeed, upon rearranging the columns and rows of X −i bringing the submatrix corresponding to K i on the left top, write X −i and X −1 −i in block format as
−i is the identity matrix gives:
We then get (2.3), since
We can already see that there is no hope for equilibrium in the case where there exists at least one asset that can be traded by at most two traders. This result is consistent with the corresponding no-equilibrium result in two-trader markets (see for instance [Kyl89] , [Vay99] and [Viv11] ).
Lemma 2.2. If |I k | = 2 holds for some k ∈ K, there exists no Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that X * is Nash equilibrium, so that X * = F (X * ), and that I k = {i, j} holds for some k ∈ K and i, j ∈ I with i = j. If e k ∈ R K stands for the zero vector with entry 1 only in the kth coordinate, then (since π i e k = e k = π j e k ), we get from Lemma 2.1 that
A symmetric argument shows that X * j (k, k) < X * i (k, k), which leads to contradiction.
2.2.
Existence of a maximal fixed point. Taking into account Lemma 2.2, we assume hereafter that |I k | ≥ 3 holds for all k ∈ K. Under that assumption and based on the characterisation of the equilibrium negative demand slopes through (2.2), we first show that there always exists such an equilibrium. The next step toward this goal is to show that functional F defined in (2.1) is nondecreasing. For this, we need to extend the order on i∈I S X i ≻ , by defining the order
for all i ∈ I. Therefore,
which means that F is nondeacreasing. Furthermore, Lemma 2.1 gives
where B ≡ (B i ) i∈I .
Define now the two sets:
and note that L ∩ U coincides with the set of fixed points of F . From (2.5), we obtain that tB ∈ U, for all t ∈ [1, ∞). The next result is complementary.
Lemma 2.3. There exists Z ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ with Z B and with the property that rZ ∈ L, for all r ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Pick α > 0 small enough so that
Let Z i = απ i , for all i ∈ I, and note that Z (1/2)B B. The fact that |I k \ {i} | ≥ 2 holds for all k ∈ K implies
for all i ∈ I. Therefore, we obtain that
for all i ∈ I, which shows that rZ F (rZ), i.e., rZ ∈ L.
The next result shows, in particular, that a maximal solution to (2.2) exists.
Lemma 2.4. Let X 0 = B, and form a sequence (X n ) n∈N by induction, asking that X n = F (X n−1 ), for all n ∈ N. Then, the following are true:
(1) The sequence (X n ) n∈N is nonincreasing, and bounded from below by some Z ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ ; in particular, it has a limit X * := lim n→∞ X n ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ .
(2) It holds that X * = F (X * ), i.e., X * is a collection of equilibrium price impacts.
(3) For any X ∈ L, it holds that X X * .
Proof. Note that X 1 = F (B) B = X 0 . Applying F iteratively to this inequality, and using the monotonicity property (2.4), it follows that (X n ) n∈N is nonincreasing. Furthermore, with Z ∈ L as in Lemma 2.3, we have Z B = X 0 . Suppose that we have shown that Z X n−1 holds for
also holds. By induction, Z X n holds for all n ∈ N which completes the proof of statement (1).
Since the monotone limit X * := lim n→∞ X n exists and is i∈I S X i ≻ -valued, continuity of F gives
which is statement (2).
Finally, let X ∈ L. By (2.5), X F (X) B = X 0 . As in the proof of statement (1), induction
shows that X X n holds for all n ∈ N. Upon taking the limit as n → ∞, we obtain X X * , which is statement (3).
2.3. Uniqueness of the fixed point. Lemma 2.4 in fact shows that X * is the maximal solution of (2.2). We shall argue here that existence of a maximal solution of (2.2) also implies uniqueness.
In the sequel, along with the maximal solution X * = (X * i ) i∈I to (2.2) of Lemma 2.4, we let X ≡ (X i ) i∈I be any other solution. We shall show that, necessarily, X = X * . Define H := X * − X, and note that from statement (3) of Lemma 2.4,
and note that X(0) = X and X(1) = X * .
It follows directly from definition of functional F , that the mapping
is twice continuously differentiable. The next result shows that it is, in fact, "concave".
Lemma 2.5. With Φ(r) := F (X(r)) for r ∈ (0, ∞), it holds that
It follows that the function (0, ∞) ∋ r → −∂Φ(r)/∂r is nondereasing in the order of i∈I S
Proof. For all r ∈ (0, ∞) and i ∈ I, it holds that
≻ holds for r ∈ (0, ∞) and i ∈ I, it follows that
where the last line follows because
Since X −i (r)D i (r)X −i (r) = H −i is a constant matrix as a function of r ∈ (0, ∞), we obtain
Therefore, since ∂Φ i (r)/∂r = Φ i (r)D i (r)Φ i (r), we obtain
From Lemma 2.1, we have that Φ i (r) X −i (r). Also, since Φ i (r)D i (r) ∈ S , it is clear that
For 0 < r 1 < r 2 < ∞, the above implies that
completing the argument.
Lemma 2.6. It holds that X(s) ∈ L, i.e., F (X(s)) X(s), for all s ∈ [1, ∞).
Proof. Note that
In view of the fact that (0, ∞) ∋ t → −∂F (X(t))/∂t is nondecreasing as follows from Lemma 2.5,
we have
Using the fact that X(0) = X = F (X), expanding the previous, we obtain,
The previous, combined with the fact that X * = X(1) = F (X(1)) holds, gives that
Now, using again the fact that (0, ∞) ∋ t → −∂F (X(t))/∂t is nondecreasing, which implies that ∂F (X(t))/∂t H holds for all t ∈ [1, ∞), we obtain
which shows that F (X(s)) X * − H + sH = X + sH = X(s) holds for s ∈ [1, ∞).
We are now ready to complete the proof of uniqueness. Indeed, from Lemma 2.6 we have that X(2) ∈ L, and statement (3) of Lemma 2.4 gives
The latter implies that H i 0, for all i ∈ I, and since H ∈ i∈I S , it follows that H = 0.
Therefore, X = X * which essentially means that the fixed point of functional F , i.e., the equilibrium is globally unique.
2.4. Convergence to solutions through iteration. Now that uniqueness has been established, we can show that the iterative procedure will always converge to the unique root and hence finish the proof of Theorem 1.4.
Lemma 2.7. For an arbitrary X 0 ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ , form a sequence (X n ) n∈N by induction, asking that X n = F (X n−1 ), for all n ∈ N. Then, it holds that
Furthermore, if X 0 ∈ L, the sequence (X n ) n∈N is nondecreasing, while if X 0 ∈ U, the sequence (X n ) n∈N is nonincreasing.
Proof. If X 0 ∈ L, the inequality X 0 F (X 0 ) = X 1 and the monotonicity of F of the form (2.4) show by induction that (X n ) n∈N is nondecreasing. Similarly, if X 0 ∈ U, the inequality X 1 = F (X 0 ) X 0 and the monotonicity of F show that (X n ) n∈N is nonincreasing.
Given an arbitrary X 0 ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ , recall that Lemma 2.1 implies that tB ∈ U for all t ∈ [1, ∞) and that Lemma 2.3 guarantees the existence of Z ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ , such that Z B and rZ ∈ L for all r ∈ (0, 1]. Pickr ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small andt ∈ [1, ∞) sufficiently large such that follows that W ∞ = X * = Y ∞ , from which it further follows that lim n→∞ X n = X * .
2.5. The proof of Proposition 1.5. As discussed above, the main input of our market model is the traders' covariance matrices, properly scaled with their risk tolerance coefficients. The next auxiliary result, related to [MR17, Proposition 1, item (iv)], implies that the equilibrium price impacts are monotonically increasing with respect to these matrices.
Lemma 2.8. Let B 1 = (B 1 i ) i∈I ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ and B 2 = (B 2 i ) i∈I ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ be such that B 1 B 2 . If X 1 = (X 1 i ) i∈I ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ and X 2 = (X 2 i ) i∈I ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ stand for the associated unique equilibria, then X 1 X 2 .
Proof. Set F 2 to be as in (2.2) with B 2 in place of B there, and note that
which shows that X 1 F 2 (X 1 ). Then, statement (3) of Lemma 2.4 shows that X 1 X 2 .
We are now in position to complete the proof of Proposition 1.5. By monotonicity from Lemma 2.8 and the nondecreasing assumption of (B n 0 ) n∈N , we have that (X n ) n∈N is also nondecreasing in i∈I S X i ≻ . Furthermore, from Lemma 2.1 we have that
and also that
It therefore follows that (X n ) n∈N has a monotone limit X ∞ ∈ i∈I S X i ≻ . Note that since trader 0 has access to all the securities, condition (1.5) gives that the collection (X ∞ i ) i∈I\{0} solves the system (1.6).
